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Gendered Justice: Inequalities  
in the Minimum Age of Criminal 
Responsibility in Iran
Jo Staines , Nadia Aghtaie and Jessica Roy 
Abstract
Using the minimum age of criminal responsibility (MACR) in Iran as an illustration, this article explores the 
continued resistance against girls’ rights in some Islamic countries. The gendered construction of childhood 
in Iran has resulted in a differential MACR, which for boys is notably higher than that recommended by the 
United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child, yet for girls is unacceptably low. While breaches 
of girls’ rights in other areas are defended on the grounds of paternalistic concerns, it is argued that the 
MACR is a religious-politico decision that, in Iran, upholds the rights of boys but denies the rights of girls, 
propagating their wider subjugation.
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Introduction
This article explores how Article 2 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the 
Child (UNCRC), non-discrimination, is breached by having a gender-specific minimum 
age of criminal responsibility in some countries. Drawing on a case study of Iran, the arti-
cle argues that religious, political and cultural reservations to the UNCRC have meant that 
some children, primarily girls, do not have equal access to rights despite international 
agreement. The article first reflects on the problematic practice of entering reservations to 
the UNCRC and the particular challenges that arise when there is potential conflict between 
religious principles and children’s rights. Focusing on Iran as an example, the article 
explores how a specific interpretation of Islam has created a dualist approach to children’s 
rights, which discriminates against girls. This is illustrated through the low minimum age 
of criminal responsibility (MACR) of girls in Iran that, it is argued, should be challenged. 
The article concludes by proposing practical pluralism as a means to break the deadlock 
between the secular, universalist UNCRC and specific, relative religious beliefs.
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The UNCRC: Reservations About Reservations
That the UNCRC is the most ratified international treaty in history (Gadda et al., 2019) 
could be taken as an indication that there is widespread global acknowledgement that 
children are rights holders, entitled to a specific set of rights. However, the support for the 
Convention was ‘regrettably mitigated by the reservations’ entered against it (Schabas 
1996: 472). While those drafting the UNCRC aimed to establish a set of agreed rights for 
all children regardless of gender, dis/ability, culture or any other factor (Thomas, 2011), 
they did so while recognising the importance of culture and religion to children, families 
and societies. To facilitate the UNCRC’s passage and ratification, it was necessary to 
allow some measure of flexibility in interpretation and implementation, such that State 
parties were able to ostensibly commit to universal rights yet still uphold specific cultural, 
social and/or religious principles.
State parties thus were able to enter reservations to specific articles within the UNCRC 
and/or a general reservation to the Convention, on the grounds that the principles and 
provisions are not consistent with the cultural context or existing domestic legislation. 
While there has been a failure to implement all human rights treaties, the level of reserva-
tion entered against the UNCRC was particularly high (United Nations, 2020). Indeed, 
over 40 signatory states expressed concerns, limited support or added caveats on the scope 
and operation of specific articles within the UNCRC (Birnbaum et al., 2014; Cregan and 
Cuthbert, 2014; McCall-Smith, 2019), thereby, ignoring or failing to implement specific 
elements of the UNCRC where they were deemed to conflict with cultural, religious or 
‘traditional’ practices, or where there were competing financial, social or public demands. 
For example, the United Kingdom entered a reservation (albeit now withdrawn) against 
Article 22, the rights of refugee and asylum-seeking children; Australia entered a reserva-
tion against Article 37, specifically against the need to hold imprisoned children sepa-
rately from adults; and Canada reserved the right not to apply the provisions of Article 21, 
governing adoption, as being inconsistent with customary forms of care.
As with the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women 1979, the UNCRC received the most religion-based reservations by Muslim 
states, either against the treaty as a whole or against specific articles (Hashemi, 2007). 
Although some of the concerns raised by Islamic states were taken on board during draft-
ing of the UNCRC, leading to significant amendments to Articles 14 and 20, for example, 
reservations to its implementation were still made. For instance, six Muslim states (Qatar, 
Iran, Saudi Arabia, Brunei Darussalam, Syria and Oman) entered General Sharia Based 
Reservations, while others entered Specific Sharia Based Reservations against individual 
articles (Hashemi, 2007). For example, both Iraq and Morocco entered specific reserva-
tions against Article 14, stating that Islam is the state religion and, therefore, freedom of 
choice in religious matters is not an option (Habashi, 2015; Langlaude, 2008).
Neither the Committee nor the Convention provides guidance on how to resolve the 
inherent religious tensions that were raised during the processes of developing and ratify-
ing the UNCRC nor provides an answer to how potentially harmful religious practices can 
be managed (Freeman, 1998, 2011b; Langlaude, 2008). These tensions can be understood 
as conflict between different communities of judgement, with competing communities 
claiming that they provide the appropriate framework for judging (Freeman, 2011). Each 
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community interprets children’s rights according to their own cultural, economic, political 
and religious situation, with the rights assigned under UNCRC undergoing a ‘cultural 
journey’ (Quennerstedt, 2012: 104), as they are transformed from the universal level to 
the particular context. However, not all cultural and religious interpretations of rights are 
acceptable to children’s rights advocates, as they may conflict with a child’s best interests 
(Article 3) or other rights within the UNCRC. Furthermore, the UNCRC expects ‘due 
account’ to be taken of traditions and cultural values and recognises that the child’s wel-
fare may be ‘trumped’ in certain situations by cultural values and traditions (Freeman, 
1998: 438). Children’s rights are, therefore, not always respected and are sometimes 
openly violated (Collins, 2019; Gadda et al., 2019).
Arguably, allowing reservations may represent a compromise enabling states to ratify 
treaties that they otherwise would not endorse. In the case of children’s rights, this may 
mean that children at least have access to some of their UNCRC defined rights and allows 
some acknowledgement of culture. However, the entering of reservations against specific 
articles of the UNCRC means that states can take a ‘pick and mix’ approach to rights such 
that children in different countries have very different experiences of being rights holders, 
and have led to the selective use of the UNCRC, with state parties citing it when conveni-
ent and ignoring it when it is not – either in its entirety or in its constituent parts (Freeman, 
2011).
Entering general or specific reservations is thus contentious, particularly when it leads 
to widespread discrimination, as has occurred in Iran. Kilkelly (2019) argues that imple-
menting the UNCRC wholesale cannot be disputed and that the provisions of the 
Convention are indivisible and inter-dependent; as such states should not be able to selec-
tively refuse to accept specific articles with which they disagree. Indeed, the United 
Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC, 2016a) has expressed concern 
about the imprecise and broad nature of the wording of reservations that may affect the 
implementation of rights, and which may raise questions about the compatibility of the 
reservations with the intent and purpose of the UNCRC (see also Hashemi, 2007; Schabas, 
1996). For example, the general reservation entered by Iran says,
The Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran reserves the right not to apply any provisions 
or articles of the Convention that are incompatible with Islamic Laws and the international 
legislation in effect
This enables the government to veto its commitment to children’s rights if they are 
deemed not to be in accordance with Sharia law. Furthermore, a judgement made by the 
Iranian Supreme Court in July 2012 states that in the case of a conflict between domestic 
legislation and the Convention, the former should prevail (UNCRC, 2016a). In essence, 
general reservations such as that made by Iran demonstrate that there is ongoing resist-
ance to the concept of children’s rights itself; objecting to any one Article or denying any 
specific right, indicates a more fundamental objection to the underlying principle of chil-
dren as rights holders.
Arguably, the general reservation made by the Iranian State disproportionately dis-
criminates against girls, in breach of Article 2 of the UNCRC – a general principle of the 
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Convention that is considered by the Committee on the Rights of the Child to be funda-
mental to the implementation of the Convention. Concerns about gender discrimination 
were identified as early as 1995 with the ‘Day of Discussion’ focusing on the ‘serious and 
unresolved of inequality and indifference, manifested by discrimination, neglect, exploi-
tation and violence’ (UNCRC, 1995: 48) which girls (and women) experience. The 
Committee noted that cultural traditions and prejudices were the primary barrier to girls 
and women being able to access their rights as laid out in international law. These included 
issues such as education, the differential age of child marriage, female genital mutilation 
and the ‘traditional’ caring roles girls were expected to take on. In 1995, the Committee 
recommended that state parties should enshrine in law the principles of non-discrimina-
tion (reflecting Article 2 of the UNCRC), however, the issues of gender discrimination 
remain a significant global issue, particularly when legitimised through particular reli-
gious beliefs and practices.
Religion and Children’s Rights
The universality of international treaties has been contested in light of the different con-
ceptions and experiences of childhood that exist across the globe (Bentley, 2005), and it 
is recognised that points of conflict and dissonance are the inevitable result of different 
cultural and religious contexts, wherein attitudes to children – and children’s rights – vary 
significantly (Burr, 2004). It can be argued that the UNCRC represents a particular, 
Western, individualistic and secular model of childhood. Attempts to impose these values 
and standards on countries with a different moral, cultural and/or religious frame of refer-
ence (Cregan and Cuthbert, 2014; Thomas, 2011) raise questions about its legitimacy, 
appropriateness and effectiveness. Indeed, it has been recognised that childhood cannot be 
understood outside the context of other factors including gender, class, ethnicity and cul-
ture (Freeman, 1998) – a list to which religion should be added.
It must be noted that any discussion of the role of religion in children’s lives is likely to 
be controversial: religion is an emotive, complex subject, which matters greatly to chil-
dren, parents, religious communities and the state (Langlaude, 2008). A majority religion 
may be a core part of a nation’s identity and discourse (Habashi, 2015), and therefore, 
matters challenging one’s understanding of religion may also present uncomfortable chal-
lenges to the national identity, social traditions and customs. Particular tensions may arise 
when the teachings of a religion are interpreted in a manner that conflicts with, or ulti-
mately denies, children’s rights (Freeman, 2011; Watson et al., 2015). Religious followers 
may argue that it is in the best interest of the child to be brought up as a religious being 
and to belong to a religious community (Langlaude, 2008), yet aspects of the religion may 
constrain universally agreed rights, potentially causing harm. Some of these tensions may 
affect the rights of both adults and children (such as gender discrimination, as noted ear-
lier), whereas others are specific to children (e.g. adoption practices, child marriage or 
religious practices such as circumcision – both male and female). As will be discussed 
below, a gender-biased reading of religious texts does not equate to the religion itself and, 
therefore, by challenging the MACR within the Iran context, Islamic teaching is not being 
refuted, the challenge is instead against the distorted interpretation by the Iranian State. It 
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is noted, for example, that alternative interpretations of Islamic law within other majority 
Muslim countries have not led to a gender differentiated MACR. At the same time, it 
should be acknowledged that the approach presented here maybe refuted by some schol-
ars who believe the Islamic texts structurally marginalise women and sanction imbal-
anced gender power and, therefore, that they should be abandoned all together (for further 
discussion, see Kusha, 2002). However, a monolithic understanding of Sharia law does 
not leave room for negotiating how the UNCRC could be implemented in the Islamic 
world.
Iran: Intra-Country Dualism and the Resistance to Children’s 
Rights
That children’s rights differ significantly between countries is widely acknowledged but 
there is further differentiation within some countries. This is particularly problematic 
where there are systems of legal dualism; that is, where there are separate systems of law 
that govern aspects of individuals’ lives. In these situations, a child’s access to their rights 
may be dependent on gender, age, religion and/or ethnicity. For example, in Israel, crimi-
nal legislation has a differential construction of childhood, based on national lines within 
the Occupied Palestinian Territories: the age of majority (adulthood) for Israeli settlers is 
18 years, compared with just 16 years for Palestinians (Viterbo, 2012). Furthermore, 
Palestinian children may experience rights’ violations, such as detention, inhibition of 
movement and control of health care and education, due to Israeli occupation (Habashi, 
2015).
Intra-country dualism is particularly apparent in Iran, where the commitment to inter-
national standards of rights for children, such as the UNCRC, is deemed subordinate to 
the principles of Sharia (Rajabi-Ardeshiri, 2009). As noted earlier, the importance of reli-
gious principles was overlooked by those drafting the UNCRC, and there was arguably a 
lack of cultural sensitivity in understanding how children’s rights are framed within 
Sharia. While the UNCRC takes a secular, individualistic approach to rights, Sharia places 
a much greater emphasis on children’s position within their family and family circum-
stances (Habashi, 2015). A strong generational hierarchy excludes children from involve-
ment in decision-making (Rajabi-Ardeshiri, 2009) and children’s rights are enmeshed 
with the rights of their parents (Habashi, 2015). As noted earlier, the Iranian Supreme 
Court issued a judgement in 2012 that stated that domestic (Sharia) legislation should 
prevail over the UNCRC, effectively enabling the rights of children to be disregarded 
whenever they conflict with or challenge the interpretation of Sharia. This reservation has 
allowed a ‘cloak of Islam’ to be pulled over the UNCRC to justify the denial of both spe-
cific rights and the general concept of children’s rights. However, this had a significantly 
more negative affect on girls than boys, due to gender discrimination inherent within the 
dominant interpretation of Islam within the Iranian context.
The incorporation of religious beliefs into legislation and policy in Iran stems from the 
process of Islamisation that began after the Iranian Revolution in 1979. This had a sig-
nificant influence on gender roles and expectations for girls and women within Iran, and 
on their status as rights holders within the family and society (Author, 2015).1 When the 
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Revolutionaries overthrew the Shah, Ayatollah Khomeini (a cleric) took over as the reli-
gious leader. He set in motion a process of Islamisation which affected the Iranian people 
– both adults and children – within private and public realms (Paidar, 2001; Author, 
2015, 2016), rescinding some of the relatively progressive policies that had been imple-
mented during the White Revolution (1963–1979; Moghadam, 1999). Clerical rule and 
the rapid Islamisation of legislation brought about a profound change in the Civil and 
Penal Codes of the country. For instance, the Islamisation of laws meant that the Family 
Protection Law of 1967 (which had been more gender-egalitarian; see Keddie, 2000) was 
immediately annulled and a new Family Law was introduced. The new Family Law 
stressed the notions of men as women’s guardians and of male ownership of female bod-
ies (Aghtaie, 2015, 2016) and, as such, had a detrimental impact on the female popula-
tion of Iran.
Many of these legal changes resulted from the idea of ‘sanctioned guardianship’, which 
extended a husband’s right to control his wife’s mobility and employment, police her 
sexuality and gain total control over the marital bed (see, for example, Civil Code of Iran, 
Articles 1105 and 1117; Birnbaum et al., 2014; Paidar, 2001; Aghtaie, 2015, 2016). This 
sanctioned guardianship assumes that men are naturally wiser and more capable than 
women in making decisions (Aghtaie, 2015). Scholars such as Afshar (1982) and Yeganeh 
(1982) believed that clerics such as Khomeini and Motahhari, his foremost ally, were 
adamant that women are inferior to men because of their alleged inherent emotional sen-
sitivity and deficient rational judgement. Motahhari (1979) repeatedly stated that men are 
rational and women emotional, presumptions that were reiterated by other religious 
scholars:
The female brain has a larger capacity for dealing with emotions, creativity, and spirituality, 
whereas the male brain has more capacity to deal with deliberate and abstract thought. In light 
of these differences, men and women are believed to have equal but different rights. (Bahonar, 
1984: 155)
Bahonar (1984) condemned the Western assumption that having the same quantified 
rights conveys equality between genders. It is worth noting that, at the time of Bahonar’s 
comments, the consensus in the West on gender equality was relatively recent and was – 
indeed still is – contentious, but he echoed Motahhari’s views, stating that women and 
men are naturally different from each other and, therefore, although they should enjoy 
equivalent human rights, their inherent differences produce different rights and obliga-
tions. This belief led to other gender discriminatory practices supported by clerical rule, 
including reinstating men’s unilateral right to divorce (Civil Code, Article 1133), men’s 
right to polygamous marriages (Civil Code, Article 942) and designating the husband as 
the head of family (Civil Code, Article 1105). Furthermore, within the criminal courts, 
women’s rights can only be discussed and decided upon by religious male figures in Iran 
– seemingly due to assumptions made about their inability to engage in ‘deliberate’, 
‘rational’ and ‘abstract’ thought, as noted earlier. At the same time, women and girls are 
held accountable for the moral corruption of men and are thus expected to wear the hijab 
to protect men from moral and social ‘dangers’. Thus, women and girls are simultane-
ously being constructed as both in need of protection due to their own incompetence and 
as a threat to men who require protection from women’s inherent sexuality.
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The Iranian State’s interpretation of Sharia exacerbated gendered expectations and prop-
agated a gendered construction of childhood, which has legitimised wider rights’ abuses 
and discrimination against girls. Girl children were particularly impacted by the changes to 
marital legislation within the Civil Code, with girls being able to be married at an earlier 
age than boys, which may limit their right to freedom in matters of reproductive health 
(Birnbaum et al., 2014). Earlier marital age may also have a negative impact on young 
girls’ ability to access education and economic opportunities, and places them at risk of 
sexual violence, including marital rape (UNCRC, 2016a). Religious principles set by the 
Iranian State have thus been used to play a significant role in the repression of women and 
children, particularly female children, with constitutional, educational and legal systems 
systematically enforcing gender discrimination from an early age. For example, the Civil 
Code of Iran pertains to children’s upbringing and indicates that, although both parents are 
responsible for their children’s upbringing (Article 1168), priority is granted to the father. 
Male guardianship excludes mothers from the management and supervision of their chil-
dren’s affairs beyond infancy (Civil Code, Article 1181 and 1169). Article 1169 specifi-
cally states that male children below the age of two are under the care of their mothers, but 
after that the father is given custody. However, this differs for female children whereby 
fathers are awarded custody when the female child reaches the age of seven.
The gendered interpretation of Sharia in Iran thus gives rise to a dualist approach to the 
rights of boys and girls. This discrimination against girls in Iran is particularly evident within 
criminal law, whereby the MACR for girls is set at just nine lunar years old, compared with 
15 lunar years for boys, and it is to this discrimination that the article now turns.
Determining the Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility
There is no categorical international standard MACR, but the provisions of several inter-
national human rights instruments are pertinent (see Goldson, 2013). The UN Committee 
on the Rights of the Child recommends a separate justice system for all those aged below 
18 and supports those states which apply protections to children up to the age of 21. 
Article 40 (3) of the UNCRC states that children in conflict with the law have the right to 
be treated:
. . . in a manner consistent with the promotion of the child’s sense of dignity and worth, which 
reinforces the child’s respect for the human rights and fundamental freedoms of others and 
which takes into account the child’s age and the desirability of promoting the child’s 
reintegration and the child’s assuming a constructive role in society. (UNCRC, 1989, emphasis 
added)
The ratification of the UNCRC requires states to establish an age of criminal responsi-
bility below which children will be presumed not to have the capacity to infringe the 
criminal law, taking into account their likely maturity. Rule 4(1) of the Beijing Rules 
(United Nations, n.d) states that
In those legal systems recognizing the concept of the age of criminal responsibility for juveniles, 
the beginning of that age shall not be fixed at too low an age level, bearing in mind the facts of 
emotional, mental and intellectual maturity.
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More recently, the United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child (2019) has 
recommended that the MACR should be a minimum of 14 years. However, this is a rec-
ommendation rather than being legally binding and there is still a margin of discretion that 
has contributed to significant global variation in the MACR. In many jurisdictions, the 
basis for ascertaining the MACR often reflects political, cultural, social or religious beliefs 
and constructions of childhood, rather than being informed by an understanding of psy-
chology, neurology, emotional development or a commitment to children’s rights.
Most commonly, the worldwide MACR is 14 years (Hazel, 2008); indeed, Iran is argu-
ably progressive in that the MACR for boys is 15 years. Lower ages of criminal responsi-
bility are not uncommon across the world; for example, in the United States, only 22 
states have a set MACR and these range from 6 to 12 years old (National Juvenile Defender 
Center (NJDC), 2020); in other states, children of any age may be held to be criminally 
responsible. The MACR in Belize is 11 years; in England, it is 10 years; and in Kenya, it 
is just 8 years old (see Child Rights International Network, n.d.). In many of these cases, 
it is evident that the MACR is a political choice rather than reflecting children’s compe-
tency, development, or rights.
A Gendered Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility
Contextually, in Western states, girls have been subject to different standards than boys 
within justice systems, for example, regarding crimes of ‘sexuality’ (Pasko, 2017) or the 
provision of custodial placements within England and Wales, whereby there are no spe-
cific custodial facilities for girls and young women (Allen, 2016). However, most coun-
tries do not differentiate between boys and girls in matters of civil or criminal rights and 
responsibilities, including the MACR. However, within some Islamic countries, such as 
Iran, the gendered construction of childhood has resulted in a system of divided rights, 
with specific rights being granted to some children (boys) but not others (girls). By using 
the notion of ‘religious puberty’ as a measure of maturity, Iran, and some other Islamic 
countries such as Brunei Darussalam, Sudan, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, 
enable overt discrimination against girls, because the age at which religious puberty is 
deemed to have been reached differs between boys and girls. The age of religious puberty 
is specified within the Civil Code of Iran and is considered to be the age at which a child 
is subject to all the rights, duties and responsibilities of an adult, including property own-
ership, marriage, religious duties and criminal responsibility (Hashemi, 2007). Boys in 
Iran are considered to have such responsibility when they are 15 lunar years old (14 years 
and 7 months), whereas girls are considered to have reached religious puberty a full 6 years 
earlier, at 9 lunar years (8 years and 9 months). The Islamic Penalties Act (2013) does not 
itself specify a chronological age of criminal responsibility, but effectively establishes it 
by reference to religious puberty, such that girls are held criminally responsible at the age 
of 9 lunar years, whereas boys are not deemed to have such responsibility unit they are 
15 years.
The MACR in Iran thus is not delineated by the recommendations of the UN Committee 
on the Rights of the Child nor on an understanding of child development but is based on 
powerful religious doctrine – the interpretation of which is used to mask the commitments 
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to the UNCRC. It is of note that 15 years old is a reasonable MACR and is above the 
UNCRC’s suggested minimum (UNCRC, 2019) and higher than the median age across 
the globe. This apparent accordance with international guidance – for boys – makes the 
low MACR for girls even more unacceptable. Indeed, the Concluding Observations on 
Iran made by the UN Committee (2016a) reiterated the need for Iran, as a matter of prior-
ity, to increase the MACR for girls and ensure that girls and boys are treated on equal 
terms throughout the criminal justice system. Furthermore, the Committee questioned the 
wide discretion given to the judiciary in interpreting and implementing Sharia, such as 
relating the age of marriage and the age of criminal responsibility to the notion of reli-
gious puberty, especially when there is limited justification for the specific age at which 
religious puberty is deemed to have been achieved.
The gendered approach to the MACR in Iran creates a 6-year disparity between the 
protections ascribed to boys and girls; this disparity perpetuates the perceived difference 
in capacity and status between girls and boys in other areas too. Setting an MACR of 
9 years creates a social (symbolic) and statutory (institutionalised) construction of the girl 
child as being mature, responsibilised and adultified (Goldson, 2013). This image of a 
mature girl child can then be used to further subjugate girls to the control of men, for 
example, constructing girls as sexually mature – and therefore, sexually available and of 
an age to be married. Setting a low MACR, linked to the notion of religious puberty, does 
not take into account the impact of social conditions on children’s development or their 
ability to exercise free will. This may be particularly an issue for women and girls in Iran 
who face subjugation and control in so many areas of their lives (Kusha, 2002). For 
instance, in the legal system of the Islamic Republic of Iran the gender of the witness 
influences the perceived validity of the testimony. In some cases, the testimony of a 
woman is only used to substantiate a man’s testimony and in others, where the testimony 
of a woman is considered valid, the testimony of a man is deemed equivalent to the testi-
mony of two women (Mehrpoor, 2002). This illustrates the contradictory nature of the 
Iranian gender ideology: on one hand, girls are deemed mature and hence responsible for 
their actions, yet on the other hand, when they reach the age of puberty, their rationality is 
questioned due to their gender.
Challenging the Resistance to the Rights of Girls
The powerful influence of religion within Iran, illustrated here through the gendered 
delineation of the MACR, raises questions about Iran’s wider commitment to children’s 
rights, and particularly the rights of girls. Some Muslim feminists argue that some of the 
laws are dated and should not apply to the current era, suggesting that the sacred text 
should be reinterpreted. They believe that gender equality can be achieved if Sharia is 
read and interpreted through a feminist lens and by utilising dynamic ijtihad2 (Afshar, 
1998; Mir-Hosseini, 1996). Others, such as Mojab (1995), argue that, even if feminist 
interpretations are adopted in order to reform discriminatory laws, this would entail a 
radical change or even the abandonment of its theological basis due to Sharia’s deeply 
rooted patriarchal nature. Mojab (1995) does not dispute that patriarchy cannot be reduced 
to religion but is adamant that it would not be possible to ‘degenderise’ Islam and 
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transform it into an ideology that is gender neutral. A more optimistic view is adopted 
here, in the belief that religion does not need to be rejected to be able to enhance and 
uphold children’s rights. The plurality of interpretations of Islamic texts in different con-
texts, and the impact of Muslim feminists’ stance on improving women’s position, is a 
valid indication of the potential for change.
The impact of the UNCRC in Iran remains limited (as it does in many countries). The 
UN Committee on the Rights of the Child has no power to impose any significant penalty 
against countries that do not uphold children’s rights (Hoffman, 2019). For example, the 
Committee’s concluding observations have made little or no difference in Israel where the 
differential demarcation of childhood along national lines (16 years for Palestinians and 
18 years for Israelis in occupied territories) has been repeatedly denounced (Viterbo, 
2012) or England, where the MACR remains at age 10, despite recurrent criticism. 
Without judicial enforcement, the ratification of the UNCRC is – arguably – just ‘win-
dow-dressing’ and not used as the basis for policy or practice (Hoffman, 2019).
However, while doubts have been raised about the utility of the UNCRC in bringing 
about meaningful changes in state behaviour, there is evidence that the CRC has been 
effective at encouraging change in many countries. When the MACR of 10 years was 
proposed in Ireland, the Committee intervened and it is now 12 years (with safeguards to 
the age of 14; UNCRC, 2016b). In Nepal, significant changes were made to the juvenile 
justice system on recommendations made by the CRC in concluding observations 
(although notably the MACR remains at 10 years; Save the Children, 2009). In these 
examples, as others, being part of the monitoring process has been a means by which 
change has been influenced and guided by the UNCRC.
Nonetheless, problems commonly arise in enforcement when the UNCRC is in conflict 
with national law, policy or practice. This is particularly difficult when it conflicts with 
the majority religion, as it requires understanding and perhaps challenging the fundamen-
tal principles of the religion – which, as noted earlier, may be intrinsically entwined with 
national identity and narrative (Habashi, 2015). The premise of the UNCRC remains in 
competition with Iran’s interpretation of Sharia and how it frames laws for children 
(Habashi, 2015). Hoffman (2019) found that there was judicial reticence to trespass on 
perceived terrain of elected politicians in the United Kingdom and it is highly feasible that 
there is similar reticence to challenge predominant religious views in countries such as 
Iran. However, there is a need to articulate the tensions between religious and secular 
interpretations of children’s rights, to enable progress towards equal rights and protection 
for boys and girls.
The dispute presented in this article is between the gender-equal, ‘universal’ stance of 
the UNCRC and the gendered, cultural relativist interpretation of Sharia in Iran, which 
has been used to justify an only partial acceptance of children’s rights. Arguably, attempt-
ing to resolve this conflict through the implementation of new legislation, or increasing 
the enforceability of existing standards through the imposition of sanctions is likely to be 
unsuccessful: the UNCRC can be seen as an unwelcome, external imposition that goes 
against the grain of traditional values (Thomas, 2011). Any additional legislation or sanc-
tions are thus likely to be ignored or refuted, especially if enforcement and the threat of 
sanctions only target Muslim countries and ignore the reservations that have been put in 
Staines et al. 11
place by the global north. Instead, it may be more productive to understand the impact of 
religion through the lens of cultural – or religious – pluralism (Freeman, 2011).
Concluding Thoughts: Religious Pluralism – A Way Forward?
Relying on cultural relativism allows difficult moral questions to be ‘fudged’ (Freeman, 
1998) with challenging practices being accepted on the grounds of tradition or custom. By 
contrast, cultural or religious pluralists believe there are many reasonable conceptions of 
a good life, and many values upon which this realisation can depend (Freeman, 1998). 
However, even if a pluralist approach is accepted, there still needs to be agreed basic 
standards that countries will uphold; where there are conflicts between these conceptions 
and values, political ethics need to surmount them. This article echoes the view that, 
instead of confrontation, key parties need to engage in dialogue with the aim of enlarging 
a shared common sense or understanding (Freeman, 2011). Using a model of religious 
pluralism allows us to envisage how cultural or religious practices may be reconciled with 
children’s rights.
The UN Committee has stated a preference for a wider interpretation of religious texts 
and welcomes those interpretations that are consistent with human rights standards, 
encouraging states to consider the practices of other Muslim states who have successfully 
reconciled Islamic texts and human rights (Hashemi, 2007). The Committee has also rec-
ommended mobilising religious leaders to be gender sensitive – which may also then 
influence government organisations (including schools and institutions) that are led by 
religious leaders. However, it has stopped short of identifying specific good examples of 
countries that balance adherence with principles of faith with children’s rights (Hashemi, 
2007; Hoffman, 2019) – perhaps doing so would help other countries develop a similar 
stance.
There are relevant examples from other Muslim majority countries that could be pro-
moted as models of gender equality. For example, legislation and policy in other Islamic 
countries demonstrate that there can be multiple ways of interpreting Sharia, some of 
which may be more aligned with the principles of the UNCRC. As noted earlier, other 
majority Islamic countries do not differentiate between children on the basis of gender 
and have MACR that are non-discriminatory (Child Rights International Network, n.d.). 
There are also examples of how mobilising religious leaders can be successful – for 
instance, there has been progress in Iran in relation to child execution whereby the child’s 
best interests are now taken into consideration and may lead to a reduced sentence (Aghtaie 
and Staines, in press), highlighting the value of collaboration between religious figures. 
Perhaps Iranian lawmakers, religious leaders and politicians can be encouraged to further 
consider how other Muslim nations manage to integrate the UNCRC without transgress-
ing Islamic principles.
The challenge, thus, is to enable the interpretation and implementation of the provi-
sions of the UNCRC in a culturally sensitive, nuanced way that ensures children’s rights 
make sense in different cultural and religious contexts, and which reduces resistance to 
the concept of children’s rights. Merely arguing that the provisions of the UNCRC must 
be implemented is unlikely to achieve change; rather, an interpretation of Sharia that does 
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not justify privileges for boys over girls and that commits to children’s rights per se needs 
to be encouraged (Rajabi-Ardeshiri, 2009). There is a need to develop an approach to 
religious interpretation that can integrate legal traditions with modern universal values 
(Hashemi, 2007). This requires a multi-faceted approach, for example, emphasising areas 
of consensus among Muslims, such as Islamic principles of tolerance and equality. The 
plurality of religious interpretation and its fruitfulness has been evident in Muslim femi-
nists’ efforts to change some of the gender discriminatory laws in Iran that had produced 
fertile grounds for violence against women.
However, successful implementation of the UNCRC begins with acceptance of the idea 
that children have rights and the creation of a culture of support for children’s rights 
among society, the public and the media (Hoffman, 2019; Kilkelly, 2019). In this instance, 
there needs to be acceptance of the idea that all children have rights, and that girls have 
equal rights to boys. State bodies – be they religious authorities, or governments – need to 
collaborate with private and public sectors to develop a shared ideology that informs leg-
islation and policy (Gadda et al., 2019). Legislation resulting from such collaboration may 
confirm internationally accepted rights of protection and provision; additional legislation 
provides a symbolic commitment to specific rights based expectations (Hoffman, 2019). 
This legislation can also provide a platform for constructive dialogue on children’s rights 
within and across states, which could support the cultural transformation required to 
ensure the implementation of child rights (Collins, 2019).
Progress in recognising and upholding children’s rights requires the acceptance and 
involvement of a wide range of actors, including – but not limited to – parents and 
wider families, non-State services and organisations, non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs), businesses, media and academics (Collins, 2019) – a list which should also 
include religious authorities. These individuals, organisations and authorities need to 
facilitate dialogue that addresses the tensions between a relativist reading of Sharia 
and the universalist, secular interpretation of children’s rights within the UNCRC, to 
encourage a more contemporary reading of Islam that acknowledges modern societal 
challenges and expectations (Habashi, 2015), such as the equal and non-discriminatory 
treatment of boys and girls.
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Notes
1. This is not to say that girls and women were completely liberated prior to the succession of the Revolution 
and many of the new policies had their roots in the past. Hence, the imposition of Sharia merely rein-
forced the status quo because many of the articles from the Civil and Criminal Codes of Iran had been 
based on Sharia prior to the Islamic Revolution (Aghtaie, 2015: 594).
2. Muslim feminists use the notion of dynamic ijtihad, independent reasoning, to find an Islamic solution to 
the issues pertaining to gender in/equality (Fazaeli, 2007). They dispute the argument that only men are 
qualified to exercise ijtihad. They insist that historically male religious elites with a discriminatory lens 
have had a monopoly on the practice of ijtihad.
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